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I.

INTRODUCTION

The two primary statutes that protect Minnesotans against racebased harassment 1 in the workplace are the Minnesota Human Rights Act
(“MHRA”), enacted in 1955, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Since their enactment, courts have seemingly narrowed their protections
and applied increasingly stringent standards. One such standard is the
“severe or pervasive” standard, a federal case created measure used to
determine whether workplace harassment in a given case is actionable.
The Minnesota Supreme Court, however, recently diverged from
this trend in Kenneh v. Homeward Bound, Inc. 2 In Kenneh, a sex
harassment case decided in 2020, the Court “clarif[ied] how the severe or
pervasive standard applies to claims arising under the Human Rights Act.” 3
In so doing, the court appears to have guided lower courts to apply a less
stringent standard to MHRA claims than federal courts apply to Title VII
claims. 4 Though Kenneh addressed sex harassment, it is expected to affect
race harassment jurisprudence because race and sex claims are analyzed
under the same framework.
This Article is the first of two companion articles. Its companion
examines potential impacts of the Kenneh decision on MHRA race
harassment claims and examines whether race and sex harassment claims
should continue to be analyzed interchangeably and, if they are, how the
Kenneh principles may apply to race claims. 5 This Article provides an
important backdrop for that analysis through an examination of the history
of harassment law and the severe or pervasive standard from the enactment
of the Minnesota Human Rights Act to the present day.
Specifically, this Article will show how federal courts first
recognized harassment as a form of discrimination in the context of race
and how that concept was mostly developed in the context of sex
harassment, including the creation of the severe or pervasive standard.
Then, it will show how this standard became a seemingly insurmountable
hurdle for plaintiffs to clear in the federal courts. Because Minnesota courts
often relied on “analogous” federal Title VII cases, it was not long before
Minnesota courts were relying on federal cases and the severe or pervasive
Harassment, hostile environment harassment, and hostile work environment are used
interchangeably herein.
Kenneh v. Homeward Bound, Inc., 944 N.W.2d 222 (Minn. 2020).
Id. at 231.
Id. at 222.
Frances Baillon & Michelle Gibbons, The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Not-So-Severe
“Severe or Pervasive” Standard: Potential Impacts of Kenneh v. Homeward Bound, Inc. on
Race Harassment Claims Under the Minnesota Human Rights Act, 49 MITCHELL HAMLINE
L. REV. (forthcoming 2023).
1

2
3
4
5
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standard sometimes at the expense of the plain language and purpose of the
MHRA.
II.

STATUTORY MEASURES ADDRESSING RACE HARASSMENT

In Minnesota, race harassment claims are primarily alleged under
the Minnesota Human Rights Act 6 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. 7 A review of the history and development of these statutory measures
provides important context for understanding the case law that interprets
and applies them.

A. State Statute—The Minnesota Human Rights Act
The Minnesota Human Rights Act (“MHRA” or “the Act”) was
enacted in 1955. 8 From its inception, the Act declared that it is the public
policy of Minnesota for persons in the state to be free from discrimination
in employment. 9 It described discrimination as a threat to “the rights and
privileges of the inhabitants of this state and [a] menace [to] the institutions
and foundations of democracy.” 10 The Act also mandated its provisions be
construed liberally to accomplish its stated purpose: to free the workplace
of discrimination. 11
The MHRA declares it an unfair practice for an employer to
discriminate based on race. In 1955, the Act read:
It is an unfair employment practice . . . for an employer, because
of race, color, creed, religion, or national origin, (a) to refuse to
hire an applicant for employment; or (b) to discharge an
employee; or (c) to discriminate against an employee with respect

MINN. STAT. §§ 363A.01–.50 (2021).
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17. In some situations, these claims are alleged under Section
1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, enacted shortly after the Civil War to vindicate the
rights of former slaves. 42 U.S.C § 1981. Section 1981 ensures that “all persons . . . shall
have the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, [and] give evidence
. . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.” 42 U.S.C. §1981(a). Section 1981, like Title VII, does
not define harassment, but prohibits it in employment and applies the same standards used
in Title VII claims. See Ross v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 293 F.3d 1041, 1050 (8th
Cir. 2002). To the extent a Section 1981 claim is alleged along with a Title VII claim in any
case cited in this article, only Title VII will be cited and discussed, as the analysis is
approximately the same.
Minnesota State Act for Fair Employment Practices, ch. 516, 1955 Minn. Laws 802 (H.F.
No. 778), amended by State Anti-Discrimination Act, ch. 428, 1961 Minn. Laws 641 (H.F.
No. 867) and Minnesota Human Rights Act, ch. 729, 1973 Minn. Laws 2158 (H.F. No. 377).
MINN. STAT. § 363.12 (1957) (“As a guide to the interpretation and application of this act,
be it enacted that the public policy of this state is to foster the employment of all individuals
in this state in accordance with their fullest capacities, regardless of their race, color, creed,
religion, or national origin, and to safeguard their rights to obtain and hold employment
without discrimination.”) (current version at MINN. STAT. § 363A.02, subdiv. 1(a)(1) (2021)).
Id. (current version at MINN. STAT. § 363A.02, subdiv. 1(b) (2021)).
Id. § 363.11 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 363A.04 (2021)).
6
7

8

9

10
11
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to his hire, tenure, compensation, terms, upgrading, conditions,
facilities or privileges of employment. 12
The term “discriminate” was defined to include “segregate or
separate.” 13 For the first twenty-five years, the MHRA did not include the
term “harassment.” In 1980, the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized that
sex harassment is a form of discrimination. 14 The court relied, in part, on
federal race harassment cases in recognizing this claim. 15 Two years later,
the legislature amended the MHRA to define sexual harassment 16 and
included the term within the definition of “discriminate.” 17

B. Federal Statute—Title VII
Federal claims for race harassment are typically alleged under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 18 The Civil Rights Act of 1964, known as
“Title VII,” states it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer “to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
Id. § 363.03(2) (current version at MINN. STAT. § 363A.08, subdiv. 2 (2021)) (Chapter
516—H.F. No. 778). “Sex” was not added to the list of protected categories until 1969. 1969
Minn. Laws 1937, 1938.
MINN. STAT. § 363.01, subdiv. 10 (1957).
See Cont’l Can Co. v. State, 297 N.W.2d 241, 249 (Minn. 1980).
Id. at 247–48.
MINN. STAT. § 363.01, subdiv. 10a (1982) (1982 c 619 Sec. 2).

12

13
14
15
16

“Sexual harassment” includes unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual
favors, sexually motivated physical contact or other verbal or physical conduct
or communication of a sexual nature when:
(1) submission to that conduct or communication is made a term or condition,
either explicitly or implicitly, of obtaining employment, public accommodations
or public services, education, or housing;
(2) submission to or rejection of that conduct or communication by an
individual is used as a factor in decisions affecting that individual's employment,
public accommodations or public services, education, or housing; or
(3) that conduct or communication has the purpose or effect of substantially
interfering with an individual's employment, public accommodations or public
services, education, or housing, or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
employment, public accommodations, public services, educational, or housing
environment and in the case of employment, the employer knows or should
know of the existence of the harassment and fails to take timely and appropriate
action.

Id. In 2001, the Legislature removed the phrase, “and in the case of employment, the

employer knows or should know of the existence of the harassment and fails to take timely
and appropriate action.” (Chapter 194 (2001 c 194 Sec. 1.) Act of May 24, 2001, ch. 194,
2001 Minn. Laws 723, 724 (S.F. No. 1215) (codified at MINN. STAT. § 363.01, subdiv. 41(3)
(Supp. 2001)). The legislative history indicates this amendment was intended to adopt the
federal standard of liability for harassment by a supervisor. Frieler v. Carlson Mktg. Grp.,
Inc., 751 N.W.2d 558, 566–67 (Minn. 2008). The Minnesota Supreme Court adopted a
broader definition. Id. at 572–73.
MINN. STAT. § 363.01, subdiv. 10 (1982) (“The term ‘discriminate’ includes segregate or
separate and, for purposes of discrimination based on sex, it includes sexual harassment.”)
(emphasis added).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e. In some situations, these claims are alleged under Section 1981 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
17

18
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discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 19 Title VII was enacted to “improve
the economic and social conditions of minorities and women by providing
equality of opportunity in the workplace. These conditions were part of a
larger pattern of restriction, exclusion, discrimination, segregation, and
inferior treatment of minorities and women in many areas of life.” 20 While
Title VII seeks to make a person whole from their injuries due to
employment discrimination, “its primary objective is to avoid harm.” 21
The original text of Title VII specifically prohibited discrimination.
But it did not, and still does not, include the term “harassment.” Courts,
however, recognized race harassment as a claim because harassment creates
a discriminatory atmosphere or environment affecting the “terms,
conditions or privileges of employment” protected by Title VII. 22
III.

THE HISTORY OF RACE HARASSMENT CLAIMS AND THE
ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL “SEVERE OR PERVASIVE” STANDARD

A. Early Federal Decisions Apply an Expansive View of Title VII and
Recognize Race Harassment as a Form of Unlawful Discrimination
Rogers v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission appears to be
the first time a federal court recognized a claim of hostile environment
harassment as a form of discrimination. 23 In Rogers, plaintiff Josephine
Chavez alleged her employer created an offensive working environment by
segregating and giving discriminatory service to patients based on their
national origin. 24 The district court did not believe that Chavez was
“aggrieved” by an unlawful practice under Title VII because the patients
were the subject of the discrimination, not Chavez. 25 The Fifth Circuit
disagreed, finding “the relationship between an employee and his working
environment is of such significance as to be entitled to statutory
protection.” 26
While discrimination was viewed more narrowly as something that
manifests itself in ultimate employment actions like hiring, firing, or
promotion, the Rogers court recognized that “employment discrimination
is a far more complex and pervasive phenomenon, as the nuances and
subtleties of discriminatory employment practices are no longer confined to
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
29 C.F.R. § 1608.1(b).
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805–06 (1998) (internal citations omitted).
See infra Section III.A.
Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (stating that Rogers “was
apparently the first case to recognize a cause of action based upon a discriminatory work
environment”).
Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 236 (5th Cir. 1971).
19
20
21
22
23

24
25
26

Id.
Id. at 238.
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bread and butter issues.” 27 The court found Title VII’s very language,
“terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” to be “an expansive
concept which sweeps within its protective ambit the practice of creating a
working environment heavily charged with ethnic or racial discrimination.” 28
Prohibiting discriminatory practices beyond simply hiring and firing is
consistent with Title VII’s purpose to “eliminate the inconvenience,
unfairness, and humiliation of ethnic discrimination.” 29 Rejecting the
employer’s argument that Chavez’s claim was not viable because she alleged
discrimination directed toward patients and not toward any employee, the
court emphasized that the absence of discriminatory intent by an employer
does not redeem an otherwise unlawful employment practice. 30 Title VII’s
aim is at the “consequences or effects of an employment practice and not at
the employer’s motivation.” 31
The court also held that what constitutes actionable harassment would
evolve over time:
This language evinces a Congressional intention to define
discrimination in the broadest possible terms. Congress chose
neither to enumerate specific discriminatory practices, nor to
elucidate in extenso the parameter of such nefarious activities.
Rather, it pursued the path of wisdom by being unconstrictive,
knowing that constant change is the order of our day and that the
seemingly reasonable practices of the present can easily become
the injustices of the morrow. 32
However, possibly concerned its decision might turn Title VII into a
“general civility code,” 33 the court warned its decision should not be
“interpreted as holding that an employer’s mere utterance of an ethnic or
racial epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee falls within
the proscription of [Title VII].” 34
Id.; see also Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equal. v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 514–15
(8th Cir. 1977) (finding that condoning segregated employee “supper clubs” creates
discriminatory work environment in violation of Title VII); Harrington v. Vandalia-Butler
Board of Educ., 585 F.2d 192, 194 n.3 (6th Cir. 1978) (failing to provide female physical
education teachers similar facilities violates Title VII because “terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment” reaches the “actual working conditions of employees” and is not
confined only to equal opportunity for employment); Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass’n, 604 F.2d 1028, 1033 (7th Cir. 1979) (finding employer requirement that only female
employees wear a uniform a violation of Title VII because “terms and conditions of
employment” means more than tangible compensation).
Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238.
27

28
29
30
31
32
33
34

Id.
Id.
Id. at 239 (emphasis added).
Id. at 238 (emphasis added).
See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80–81 (1998).
Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238 (emphasis added). As described below, this “mere utterance”

concept is often used by courts to diminish the seriousness of epithets and other plainly
discriminatory comments. See infra note 139 and accompanying text. Indeed, it is hard to
imagine Rogers surviving a court’s scrutiny today.
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After Rogers, other federal courts followed suit, finding that differential
treatment created a hostile working environment for both those who are and
are not members of the minority group and that all have the right to work
in an environment free of discrimination. 35

B. Race Harassment Cases Help Pave the Way for Sex Harassment and
the Severe or Pervasive Standard
Rogers also opened the door for courts to recognize sexual and sexbased harassment as a claim under Title VII, which in turn produced the
“severe or pervasive” standard. In Henson v. Dundee, the Eleventh Circuit
cited Rogers and held that sexual harassment was actionable, reasoning that
it is “every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the workplace that
racial harassment is to racial equality.” 36
Next, in 1986, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized a claim, and set
forth a standard, for hostile environment–sexual harassment under Title
VII. In Meritor Savings Bank FSB v. Vinson, the Court adopted the
Henson court’s view comparing sexual harassment to race harassment:
“Surely, a requirement that a man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse
in return for the privilege of being allowed to work and make a living can be
as demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithets.” 37 The
Court also cited Rogers in holding that Title VII is “expansive” and provides
a cause of action based on a discriminatory work environment, as well as
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) guidance stating
that Title VII provides employees the right to work in an environment free
from harassment. 38 And, it also emphasized the holding in Rogers that the
“mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive
feelings in an employee” may not be described as harassment affecting a
term, condition, or privilege of employment. 39
Ultimately, the Court held that “[f]or sexual harassment to be
actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions
of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive working
environment.’” 40 To make this determination, a trier of fact must consider
“the record as a whole’ and ‘the totality of circumstances, such as the nature
of the sexual advances and the context in which the alleged incidents
See, e.g., Clayton v. White Hall Sch. Dist., 778 F.2d 457, 459 (8th Cir. 1985) (recognizing
that the essence of a hostile work environment claim is that “a plaintiff employee finds racial
or other discrimination in the workplace offensive or distasteful because it violates that
employee’s right to work in an atmosphere free of discrimination and to enjoy the myriad
benefits of associating with members of other racial or ethnic groups”).
Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66–67 (1986) (quoting Henson v. Dundee,
682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982)).
The allegations in Meritor include the vice president making sexual advances toward the
plaintiff, demands for sexual favors at work and afterward, fondling her in front of coworkers,
following her into the bathroom, exposing himself, and raping her several times. Id. at 59–
60.
Id. at 65–66.
Id. at 67.
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
35

36

37

38
39
40
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occurred.’” 41 Thus, the “severe or pervasive” standard was created. While
Rogers helped to “launch” 42 a new standard for sex harassment claims, the
Court in Meritor, and its progeny, do not appear to have taken an
“expansive” or “unconstrictive” view of Title VII such that it could evolve
to recognize and prevent current and future discriminatory injustices. 43
Rather, as federal courts applied the standard they took a seemingly
narrower view of Title VII.

C. Federal Courts Further Define the Severe or Pervasive Standard
After Meritor, the Supreme Court further defined the severe or
pervasive standard over a series of decisions. For example, in Harris v.
Forklift Systems, Inc., the first Title VII harassment case decided after
Meritor, the Court addressed a circuit split regarding whether actionable
conduct creating an “abusive work environment” must “seriously affect an
employee’s psychological well-being” or lead them to suffer injury. 44 Some
circuit courts had dismissed cases because the conduct was insufficiently
severe to cause “anxiety and debilitation,” 45 “poison” the working
environment, 46 or cause the plaintiff’s “psychological well being” to be
“seriously affect[ed].” 47
Some courts disagreed, finding that such a requirement does not
appear anywhere in Meritor. 48 Not only that, but “[i]t is the harasser’s
conduct which must be pervasive or severe, not the alteration in the
conditions of employment.” 49 To constitute actionable conduct, “employees
need not endure sexual harassment until their psychological well-being is
seriously affected to the extent that they suffer anxiety and debilitation.” 50
In Harris, the Court held the conduct must be both objectively and
subjectively abusive to violate Title VII, but that “Title VII comes into play
41
42
43

Id. at 69 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1985)).
Chew & Kelley, infra note 83, at 109.
Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238.

Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 20 (1993). This line of case law appears to have
stemmed from the Rogers court’s reference to an actionable hostile work environment as
“so heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional and
psychological stability of minority group workers.” Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th
Cir. 1971) (quoted in Meritor, 474 U.S. at 66).
Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210, 213 (7th Cir. 1986), abrogated by Harris v.
Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
44

45

46

Id.

Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986), abrogated by Harris
v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993); see also Morgan v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 901
F.2d 186, 193 (1st Cir. 1990), abrogated by Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993)
(affirming the district court’s conclusion that the conduct at issue was insufficient to “interfere
with a reasonable person’s work performance” or “seriously affect a reasonable person’s
psychological well-being”); Downes v. F.A.A., 775 F.2d 288, 295 (Fed. Cir. 1985), abrogated
by Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (“A second element of offensive
environment is proof that the misconduct interfered with an employee’s work or caused
serious psychological damage.”)
See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 877–78 (9th Cir. 1991).
47

48
49
50

Id.
Id. (citing EEOC Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment, 8 Fair Employment Practice

Manual (BNA) 405:6681, n.20 (March 19, 1990)).
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before the harassing conduct leads to a nervous breakdown.” 51 The Court
set forth factors to consider when determining whether the conduct meets
the “severe or pervasive” standard. The Court explained:
[W]hether an environment is ‘hostile’ or ‘abusive’ can be
determined only by looking at all the circumstances, which may
include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity;
whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere
offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with
an employee’s work performance. 52
No single factor is required, and it is not “a mathematically precise
test.” 53
Next, in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., the Supreme
Court explained the objective severity of harassment should be judged from
the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, considering
“all the circumstances.” 54 The Court further explained the objective
standard is “crucial” to preventing Title VII from becoming a “civility code,”
as it requires factfinders to consider “the social context in which particular
behavior occurs and is experienced by its target.” 55 Giving consideration to
the context and circumstances of the conduct will necessarily assist in
determining what conduct is actionable:
The real social impact of workplace behavior often depends on a
constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and
relationships which are not fully captured by a simple recitation
of the words used or the physical acts performed. Common
sense, and an appropriate sensitivity to social context, will enable
courts and juries to distinguish between simple teasing or
roughhousing among members of the same sex, and conduct
which a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would find
severely hostile or abusive. 56

Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993). The Court clarified that the language
from Rogers—stating that an actionable environment is “so heavily polluted with
discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional and psychological stability of minority
group workers”—was “merely to present some especially egregious examples of harassment.”
51

Id.
Id. at 23.
Id. The court remanded the case, and, applying the correct standard, Harris prevailed on
52
53

her claims and was awarded $150,435, attorneys’ fees, and costs. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc.,
Civ. No. 3:89-0557, 1994 WL 792661, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 9, 1994).
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) (quoting Harris, 510
U.S. at 23).
Id. To illustrate this point, the Court explained while a professional football player’s work
environment may not be severely or pervasively abusive when the coach “smacks him on the
buttocks,” that same conduct would reasonably be abusive and offensive to the coach’s
secretary. Id.
Id. at 81–82.
54

55

56
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Just a few months later, in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth and
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, the Court addressed the standard of liability
for sexual harassment specifically committed by a workplace supervisor. 57 In
addressing this issue, the Court acknowledged the development and
purpose of the severe or pervasive standard and did so in a seemingly more
restrictive manner than it had in Harris and Oncale. In Harris and Oncale,
the Court explained when determining whether the conduct is sufficiently
severe or pervasive to be actionable, lower courts should consider “all the
circumstances” 58 and distinguish ordinary socializing from discriminatory
conditions of employment by analyzing the “social context in which
particular behavior occurs and is experienced by the target.” 59 “Common
sense” and “sensitivity to social context” would provide guidance in making
this distinction. 60
In Faragher, however, the Court drew a starker contrast. 61 The Court
stated “‘simple teasing,’ offhand comments and isolated incidents (unless
extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the ‘terms
and conditions of employment.’” 62 It also emphasized the severe or
pervasive standard was designed to “filter out complaints attacking ‘the
ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of abusive
language, gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing.’” 63 Instead, the
“conduct must be extreme to amount to a change in the terms and
conditions of employment.” 64 When pointing out that “Courts of Appeal
have heeded this view,” 65 the Court cited a string of appellate cases granting
summary judgment where the harassment was not sufficiently severe or
pervasive—making the connection between summary judgment and the
“demanding” standard for hostile environment claims under Title VII. 66
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524
U.S. 775 (1998). The standard is as follows: “An employer is subject to vicarious liability to
a victimized employee for an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with . .
. authority over the employee. When no tangible employment action is taken, a defending
employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages . . . compris[ing] two
necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct
promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably
failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities . . . or to avoid harm
otherwise.” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; accord Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764–65.
Harris, 510 U.S. at 23 (stating “whether an environment is ‘hostile’ or ‘abusive’ can be
determined only by looking at all the circumstances”).
Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81.
Id. at 81–82.
See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788.
Id. (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82).
Id. (quoting B. LINDEMANN & D. KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT LAW
175 (1992) (footnotes omitted)).
Id. (emphasis added).
57

58

59
60
61
62
63

64
65
66

Id.
Id. (citing Carrero v. N.Y.C. Housing Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 577–78 (2nd Cir. 1989); then

citing Moylan v. Maries County, 792 F.2d 746, 749–50 (8th Cir. 1986); and then citing B.
LINDEMANN & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 805–07 n.290 (3d ed.
1996) (collecting cases granting summary judgment for employers because the alleged
harassment was not actionably severe or pervasive)); see also Duncan v. Cty. of Dakota, Neb.,
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Thus, these federal cases created the federal severe or pervasive
standard for hostile environment sex harassment claims. And it would not
be long until courts applied this standard to all hostile environment
harassment claims, including those based on race.
IV.

IMPACTS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS’ SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
SEX HARASSMENT STANDARDS ON RACE HARASSMENT

The Supreme Court’s sex harassment decisions influenced the
application of the severe or pervasive standard in federal sex harassment
cases, as well as race harassment cases. In Faragher, the Court explicitly
addressed whether courts should compare the two. The Court noted sex
harassment cases have drawn from standards applied in race harassment
cases to determine the severity of the offensive conditions necessary to
constitute actionable conduct. 67 While the Court recognized the standards
are not “entirely interchangeable,” it saw “good sense in seeking generally
to harmonize the standards of what amounts to actionable harassment.” 68
After Faragher, the Court applied sex harassment standards to a race
harassment claim. 69 With federal courts applying the severe or pervasive
standard to race harassment cases, in addition to an increased use of
summary judgment, Title VII’s protections appeared to be further
narrowed.

A. Federal Courts “Drift” Toward Substituting Summary Judgment for
Trial
Over time, as federal courts continued to apply the severe or pervasive
standard more stringently, a trio of U.S. Supreme Court summary judgment
cases 70 appeared to afford courts broader powers to dismiss cases via
687 F.3d 955, 960 (8th Cir. 2012) (noting the U.S. Supreme Court had established
“demanding standards” to “clear the high threshold for actionable harm”) (quoting Tuggle v.
Mangan, 348 F.3d 714, 722 (8th Cir. 2003)); Watson v. CEVA Logistics U.S., Inc., 619 F.3d
936, 942 (8th Cir. 2010) (noting that “[t]he standard is a demanding one”).
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 786–87.
Id. at 787 n.1. Faragher’s attempts to analogize sex and race harassment may have been
directed at Justice Thomas’s concerns expressed in his dissent in Ellerth that the two
decisions create a more favorable standard for sexual harassment than race harassment and
should not be adopted. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 767 (1998) (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (“As a result, employer liability under Title VII is judged by different standards
depending upon whether a sexually or racially hostile work environment is alleged. The
standard of employer liability should be the same in both instances: An employer should be
liable if, and only if, the plaintiff provinces that the employer was negligent in permitting the
supervisor’s conduct to occur.”). Some, however, have noted potential negative impacts of
analogizing and importing sex harassment standards on race harassment claims. See
generally Camille Hébert, Analogizing Race and Sex in Workplace Harassment Claims, 58
Ohio St. L.J. 819 (1997); Pat K. Chew, Freeing Racial Harassment from the Sexual
Harassment Model, 85 OR. L. REV. 615 (2006).
See, e.g., Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 116 n.10 (2002) (citing
Faragher and Meritor and volunteering that “hostile work environment claims based on racial
harassment are reviewed under the same standard as those based on sexual harassment”).
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
67
68

69

70
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summary judgment. 71 The severe or pervasive standard, coupled with courts’
increased exercise of summary judgment resulted in many sex harassment–
hostile environment claims being decided by a judge instead of a jury. Since
sex and race harassment claims were treated indistinguishably, many race
harassment–hostile environment claims suffered the same fate. 72
Prior to 1986, summary judgment was not only used sparingly, but
several courts disfavored or expressed hostility toward it. 73 But in 1986, the
U.S. Supreme Court not only decided Meritor, adopting the severe or
pervasive standard, it also decided a trio of landmark decisions addressing
the summary judgment standard—Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., and Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp.—which have been described as allowing courts greater latitude in
screening and adjudicating cases via summary judgment. 74
Indeed, these decisions are referred to as having “fundamentally
altered Rule 56 in two ways.” 75
First, these cases eased the initial burden placed on the party
moving for summary judgment by permitting a summary
judgment movant to prevail without having to establish fully the
nonexistence of material facts in dispute. Second, the Court
allowed greater district court latitude in determining the existence
of issues meriting trial, thereby easing the grant of summary
judgment. 76
This shift in the application of Rule 56 has also been interpreted by
Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court’s Shimmering View of
Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 Ohio St. L.J. 95,
100 (1988) (dubbing Celotex, Matsushita, and Liberty Lobby a “trio”); Samuel Issacharoff &
George Lowenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100 Yale L.J. 73, 74
71

(1990) (describing the “trilogy” of summary judgment cases).
See generally Hébert, supra note 68; Chew, supra note 68 at 616 (noting “[p]arties to racial
harassment cases cite to the reasoning and element of sexual harassment cases without
hesitation, as if racial harassment and sexual harassment are behaviorally and legally
indistinguishable”).
Issacharoff & Lowenstein, supra note 71, at 73, 78. (citing Steven Alan Childress, A New
Era for Summary Judgments: Recent Shifts at the Supreme Court, 6 Rev. of Litig. 263, 264
(1987); see also Croxen v. United States Chemical Corp., 558 F. Supp. 6, 7 (N.D. Iowa 1982)
(describing summary judgment as “an extreme and treacherous remedy”). The doctrinal
formulation of these aphorisms is that “summary judgment should be used sparingly in all
cases, and it is only with great caution and much soul-searching that such motions will be
granted.” Bayou Bottling, Inc. v. Dr. Pepper Co., 543 F. Supp. 1255, 1261 (W.D. La.
1982), aff’d, 725 F.2d 300 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984)).
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–24; Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 253–55; Matsushita, 475 U.S. at
582–83; see Issacharoff & Lowenstein, supra note 71, at 79. In his dissent in Liberty Lobby,
Justice Brennan lamented that the majority opinion was “full of language which could surely
be understood as an invitation—if not an instruction—to trial courts to assess and weigh
evidence much as a juror would . . . . I am fearful that this new rule—for this surely would be
a brand new procedure—will transform what is meant to provide an expedited ‘summary’
procedure into a full-blown paper trial on the merits.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 266–67
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
Issacharoff & Lowenstein, supra note 71, at 79.
72

73

74

75
76

Id.
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some as allowing a court to keep certain interpretations of fact from the factfinder and “declare a plaintiff’s theory of the case impossible as a matter of
law.” 77 These cases appear to have “transformed summary judgment from a
mechanism for assuring a modicum of genuine dispute in cases set for trial
to a full dress-rehearsal for trial with legal burdens and evidentiary standards
to match those that would apply at trial.” 78
Commentators and academics predicted that lower courts would begin
to grant summary judgment more frequently in the wake of the trio,
particularly in discrimination cases and other cases typically proved using
circumstantial (rather than direct) evidence. 79 Some commentators observed
that the trio indeed had an immediate impact on summary judgment in
cases where intent or motive were at issue, including employment
discrimination cases. 80
Members of the judiciary have also recognized the increasing use of
summary judgment. In 1997, former Seventh Circuit Chief Judge Posner
observed there had been a “drift in many areas of federal litigation toward
substituting summary judgment for trial,” ascribing this “drift” to growing
caseloads. 81 Whatever the reason, between 1975 and 2000, “the rate of cases
with [summary judgment] motions granted in whole or in part, and the rate
at which cases were terminated by summary judgment, doubled.” 82 One
study revealed significant challenges for plaintiffs in race harassment cases
during approximately the same time period. 83
The Eighth Circuit has also made clear that summary judgment is still
alive and well. In Torgerson v. City of Rochester, the court affirmed
summary judgment, holding there is no employment discrimination
exception to the summary judgment standard and that it is not disfavored in

Stempel, supra note 71, at 108.
Issacharoff & Lowenstein, supra note 71, at 87.
Stempel, supra note 71, at 175 n.393 (“In the realm of discrimination . . . continued use of
the Matsushita approach could extinguish jury trial for certain judicially disfavored claims, a
result at odds with the seventh amendment.”).
77
78
79

See Issacharoff & Lowenstein, supra note 71, at 89, 89 n.84 (citing Henn v. National
Geographic Soc’y, 819 F.2d 824 (7th Cir. 1987); Dale v. Chicago Tribune Co., 797 F.2d 458
(7th Cir. 1986); Wehrly v. American Motors Sales Corp., 678 F. Supp. 1366 (N.D. Ind.
1988)).

80

Wallace v. SMC Pneumatics, Inc., 103 F.3d 1394, 1396–97 (7th Cir. 1997); see also Hon.
Mark W. Bennett, From the “No Spittin’, No Cussin’ and No Summary Judgment Days of
81

Employment Discrimination Litigation to the “Defendant’s Summary Judgment Affirmed
without Comment” Days: One Judges’ Four-Decade Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev.

685, 701 (2013) (including increasing caseloads of federal judiciary as one reason for the
“unfriendliness towards resolving employment discrimination cases by jury trial”).
Joe S. Cecil, Rebecca N. Eyre, Dean Miletich & David Rindkopf, FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
Trends in Summary Judgment Practice: 1975–2000, at 20 (2007); see also Theresa M.
Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment in Hostile Environment Cases, 34 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 71 (1999) (addressing increasing trend granting summary judgment in hostile
environment cases and reasons this may be occurring).
Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Unwrapping Racial Harassment Law, 27 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 49 (2006) (addressing results of study on race harassment cases and outcomes
of proceedings between 1976 and 2002 which present “grim” news for plaintiffs).
82

83
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employment discrimination claims. 84 The plaintiff argued and relied upon
existing Eighth Circuit and U.S. Supreme Court precedent stating that
“summary judgment should be used sparingly in the context of employment
discrimination and/or retaliation cases where direct evidence of intent is
often difficult or impossible to obtain,” and that “intent is often the central
issue and claims are often based on inference.” 85 The court disagreed and
held that previous Eighth Circuit decisions stating summary judgment is
disfavored or should seldom be granted were “unauthorized” and should
no longer be used for purposes of the summary judgment standard of
review. 86 One commentator called this the “ultimate step” in increasing the
potential for summary judgment in employment discrimination claims. 87

B. Federal Courts Dismiss Race Harassment Claims via the Federal
Severe or Pervasive and Summary Judgment Standards
With federal courts taking a more active role in adjudicating cases via
summary judgment, coupled with the severe or pervasive standard,
workplace race harassment cases were often being dismissed by courts
rather than submitted to a jury. 88 This is on display in the following Eighth
Circuit cases dismissed at summary judgment.

1. Jackson v. Flint Ink North American Corp.
In Jackson v. Flint Ink North American Corp., 89 the district court
granted summary judgment on the plaintiff’s race-based hostile
environment claim. Jackson, a Black employee, alleged “that he heard his
supervisor . . . refer to him as ‘that damn [N-word].’” 90 Jackson also alleged
he heard a manager “use the term ‘black’ or ‘damn black.’” 91 Additionally,
Jackson alleged that coworkers uttered racially charged comments such as
“‘[N-word]-rigging’ . . . ‘[N-word]’ . . . ‘[w]e don’t listen to that damn black
music around here, [N-word] shit, radio’ . . . ‘fucking [N-word].’” 92 Lastly,
Jackson alleged that KKK signs accompanied with burning crosses were
discovered at two different locations in the workplace, and one of the signs

Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1043, 1053 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
See Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 605 F.3d 584, 593 (8th Cir. 2010), aff’d on reh’g en
banc, 643 F.3d 1031 (8th Cir. 2011) (first quoting Wallace v. DTG Operations, Inc., 442
F.3d 1112, 1117 (8th Cir. 2006); and then quoting Peterson v. Scott Cty., 406 F.3d 515, 520
(8th Cir. 2005)).
Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1043, 1058–60 (abrogating numerous cases that state an exception
to the summary judgment standard exists for discrimination claims).
Theresa M. Beiner, The Trouble with Torgerson: The Latest Effort to Summarily
Adjudicate Employment Discrimination Cases, 14 NEV. L.J. 673, 674 (2014).
Issacharoff & Lowenstein, supra note 71, at 74–75.
Jackson v. Flint Ink N. Am. Corp., 370 F.3d 791, 792 (8th Cir. 2004), rev’d, 382 F.3d 869
(8th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 793. With the exception of the “N-word” and “n***a,” this Article does not censor
slurs or other derogatory terms when they are included in the text of cited opinions.
84
85

86

87

88
89

90

91
92

Id.
Id. at 793–94.
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appeared near Jackson’s initials. 93 The district court granted summary
judgment, and Jackson appealed. 94
The Eighth Circuit initially found Jackson did not establish an
actionable hostile work environment claim. 95 The court described the
racially derogatory language as “six isolated incidents” that were not targeted
directly at Jackson or did not explicitly refer to him. 96 As such, these racebased statements were classified as “infrequent” or “offhand” and not
actionable. 97
The court found the racial graffiti incidents made “this a closer case.” 98
The court recognized the “burning cross undoubtedly evokes the Ku Klux
Klan and its racialist ideology and frequent violent history,” but it was
“unable to conclude from the evidence in the record that the crosses were
‘death threat[s] aimed directly and specifically’ at Mr. Jackson as opposed
to a generically threatening expressions [sic] of sympathy with the beliefs of
the Ku Klux Klan.” 99 The court held that Jackson’s evidence of the racial
graffiti and “sporadic” racial slurs were insufficient to show the harassment
he experienced was severe or pervasive enough to alter the terms or
conditions of his employment. 100
On petition for rehearing, the court reversed the district court’s grant
of summary judgment on the hostile environment claim. 101 The court’s
decision to reverse turned on evidence that Jackson’s name was written on
a shower wall in the workplace showing an arrow connecting his name with
a burning cross and a KKK sign. 102 The court found that an objective
observer would regard these symbols as a threat of violence, if not death. 103
This fact tipped the scale, but the court still cast doubt on the success of the
case, finding it to be on the “cusp of submissibility.” 104

2. Bainbridge v. Loffredo Gardens, Inc.
Id. at 794. The majority noted while Jackson’s initials were in the vicinity of the burning
cross graffiti, the record did not create an inference that the graffiti and Jackson’s initials were
intended to be connected or read together. Id. at 796. The dissent, however, did not think
this made a difference because whether Jackson’s initials were “connected to KKK and
burning cross graffiti is a question of fact.” Id. at 798–99 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 792 (majority opinion).
Id. at 795.
Id. at 795–96.
Id. (calling “infrequent” that “Jackson was exposed, at most, to six isolated instances of
racially derogatory language from two managers and three co-workers over the course of a
year and a half,” and calling “offhand” comments of “[N-word] shit, radio” and “[N-word]rigging” as they “were not referring directly to Mr. Jackson and another (‘fucking [N-word]’)
was made in the heat of the spitting episode, during which it is uncontradicted that Mr.
Jackson had threatened to ‘kick both of [his co-workers’] asses’ and to ‘kill’ one of them”).
Id. at 795.
Id. at 796 (quoting Reedy v. Quebecor Printing Eagle, Inc., 333 F.3d 906, 908–10 (8th Cir.
2003).
93

94
95
96
97

98
99

100
101
102
103
104

Id.

Jackson v. Flint Ink N. Am. Corp., 382 F.3d 869, 870 (8th Cir. 2004).

Id.
Id.
Id.
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In Bainbridge v. Loffredo Gardens, Inc., an employee asserted a
hostile work environment claim under Title VII, section 1981, and the Iowa
Civil Rights Act based on racial comments made about Asian people, Black
people, and other minorities. 105 Bainbridge, who was married to a Japanese
woman, claimed the employer’s owners and operators made racially
offensive remarks about Asian people, such as “Jap,” “nip,” and “gook,”
approximately once a month over a two-year period. 106 Bainbridge testified
about specific instances where one employee called another employee a
“Jap” and also referred to a customer as such. 107 The employees used other
racial slurs, including “spic,” “wetback,” “monkey,” and “[N-word].” 108
Bainbridge complained to his supervisor about the offensive behavior and
left for a scheduled vacation. 109 Six days later, before Bainbridge returned,
the employer sent him a letter stating his employment was terminated
because his interpersonal skills with subordinates were problematic. 110
Finding the racial slurs did not create a hostile work environment, 111
the court noted the racial remarks were sporadic and not specifically about
Bainbridge, his wife, or their marriage. 112 The court also noted the racial
remarks were not directed at Bainbridge and Bainbridge only overheard
some of them. 113 Thus, the remarks were not “so severe or pervasive that
[they] altered the terms or conditions of his employment.” 114
Judge Arnold, dissenting, wrote that “the repeated, seemingly habitual,
use of anti-Asian and other slurs” in front of Bainbridge was sufficient to
create a hostile work environment, and therefore summary judgment should
be reversed. 115 Referring to Jackson, Judge Arnold stated: “While I concede
that looking to the number of incidents per month reduces what is likely a
horrific emotional experience to a numeric fraction, objectively, I think one
comment every three months is different than one comment a month.” 116

3. Singletary v. Missouri Department of Corrections
In Singletary v. Missouri Department of Corrections, an African
American investigator alleged harassment based on racial slurs made by
See Bainbridge v. Loffredo Gardens, Inc., 378 F.3d 756, 758–59 (8th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 759.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 758.
Id. at 759–60.
Id. at 760. The district court in Bainbridge relied on both Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co.
and Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc. in granting summary judgment on
Bainbridge’s hostile environment claim. See Bainbridge v. Loffredo Gardens, Inc., 02-CV105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112

40192, 2003 WL 21911063, at *13 (S.D. Iowa July 31, 2003) (citing Johnson v. Bunny Bread
Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1257 (8th Cir. 1981); and then citing Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs
Football Club, Inc., 568 F.2d 87, 88 (8th Cir. 1977)).
Bainbridge, 378 F.3d at 760.
Id. The court did, however, find that Bainbridge had enough circumstantial evidence to
put his retaliation claim in front of a jury. Id. at 761.
Id. at 761 (Arnold, J., dissenting).
Id. at 762.
113
114

115
116
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coworkers and his supervisor as well as destruction of his property. 117 A
coworker referred to Singletary as a “[N-word]” twice. 118 In one instance the
coworker stated to a superior, “[Y]ou mean I can’t call him a [N-word?]” 119
Singletary raised concerns, and the coworker was subsequently demoted. 120
Singletary’s coworkers allegedly conjured up false allegations that Singletary
was engaging in wrongdoing, and his car was vandalized at the
workplace. 121 Human resources (“HR”) personnel conducted an
investigation and learned that one correctional officer overheard another
employee say, “[N-word]s around here always want to cause trouble.” 122 HR
found that Singletary was a “target” of other employees and noted a “racial
problem” in the department. 123
Referring to Singletary, one of the superintendents said, “I see we have
a little shiny face with us today,” and on another occasion, “I see we have a
shiny, little face running around here today.” 124 Staff also posted a picture of
Aunt Jemima during Black History Month. 125 Singletary requested to be and
was transferred. 126 Later, the superintendent was heard saying, “[T]hat nappy
headed little [N-word] won’t be bothering us anymore. I got rid of him.” 127
The court found these incidents insufficiently severe or pervasive to be
actionable because, for example, the “N-word” was not used in front of
Singletary, and some of the difficulties Singletary experienced could be
attributed to his position as an internal investigator. 128 As many courts before
it had done, the court in Singletary stated that “[r]acial epithets are morally
repulsive. But our cases require that a plaintiff show more than a few
occurrences over a course of years.” 129

4. Canady v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
In Canady v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., an African American man
presented evidence that his supervisor made several racial comments to
him. 130 Canady’s supervisor called him a “lawn jockey” and used the “Nword” in front of him and other employees. 131 His supervisor greeted him
117

Singletary v. Missouri Dep’t of Corr., 423 F.3d 886, 888–90 (8th Cir. 2005).

Id. at 888–89.
Id. at 889.
Id. at 888–89.
Id. at 889.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 889–90.
Id. at 890.
Id. at 893. Further, the court discounted the vandalism issue noting that there was not
enough proof to conclude that it was because of his race. Id.
Id.; see Woodland v. Joseph T. Ryerson & Son, Inc., 302 F.3d 839, 844 (8th Cir. 2002)
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128

129

(holding that while “certainly offensive” and “inexcusable,” racial epithets, racist poetry, and
racist graffiti were not actionable); Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1257 (8th
Cir. 1981) (stating that racial slurs, “while certainly not to be condoned,” do not always violate
Title VII).
Canady v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 440 F.3d 1031, 1033 (8th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1033; id. at 1036 (Lay, J., dissenting).
130
131
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with “What’s up my [n***a]?”, a statement the supervisor claimed was a
reference to a movie in an attempt to make a joke. 132 The supervisor also
described his management style as that of a “slave driver.” 133 The supervisor
“told Canady and another African-American employee that a black man’s
skin color rubs off on a towel when he sweats.” 134 Finally, he commented to
another African American employee that “all African Americans look
alike.” 135
The court held that while the supervisor’s comments were offensive,
they did not meet the threshold of actionable harm. 136 Citing the “mere
utterance” language that arose from Rogers 137 and was cited in Meritor, 138 the
court dismissed the conduct because it did not “‘sufficiently affect the
conditions of employment’ to give rise to a triable hostile work environment
claim.” 139
Judge Lay dissented, finding “lawn jockey” especially offensive, along
with the supervisor’s use of this term multiple times along with the use of
the “N-word.” 140 While the majority had noted that Smith apologized for the
slave driver comment and the “What’s up my [n***a]?” movie reference,
the dissent found the apology of minimal significance. 141

5. Smith v. Fairview Ridges Hospital
In Smith v. Fairview Ridges Hospital, an African American woman
presented evidence of numerous racially charged comments and actions by
her coworkers: 142
(1) A nurse took a “patient chart from Smith’s hands and said,
‘[T]hese black aides don’t know what they are doing’”; 143
(2) A coworker referred to Smith’s lunch as smelling worse than
garbage; 144
(3) Smith saw coworkers viewing an article on The Onion’s
website that “discussed Hurricane Katrina and contained an
image of a helicopter hovering over houses that were flooded by
the hurricane. On the front porch of one of the houses, three
people, appearing to be African-American, were pictured,” and
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139

Id. at 1036.
Id.
Id. at 1036.
Id. at 1033 (majority opinion).
Id. at 1035.
Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971).

Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).

Canady, 440 F.3d at 1035. (quoting Elmahdi v. Marriott Hotel Servs., Inc., 339 F.3d 645,

653 (8th Cir. 2003)).
Id. at 1036 (Lay, J., dissenting).
Id. (stating an apology is “by no means a panacea for harassment that has already
occurred”).
Smith v. Fairview Ridges Hosp., 625 F.3d 1076, 1081–82 (8th Cir. 2010), abrogated on
other grounds by Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031 (8th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1081.
140
141

142

143
144

Id.
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the caption read, “FEMA representatives call out to survivors,
‘Show us your tits for emergency rations!’”; 145
(4) A coworker asked Smith “if she was Puerto Rican because she
spoke Spanish”; 146
(5) Smith brought fried chicken to a work potluck, and a
coworker asked who brought fried chicken, and another
coworker responded, “Who else?”; 147
(6) A picture of the character “Buckwheat” from Little Rascals
was placed on a door next to photographs of other employees’
childhood pictures, along with the caption: “Guess who this
is?”; 148
(7) Coworkers were looking at t-shirts on the website,
www.getoffended.com, which stated “Guns don’t kill people, only
angry minorities kill people,” and “How do you stop five [Nword]s from raping a white girl? You throw them a basketball”; 149
(8) Smith overheard a coworker state, “Just like a dog, you beat
them and abuse them, they still come back. Just like any good
runaway slave would”; 150
(9) In a conversation about acne, a coworker told Smith, “People
can’t see yours because you’re black”; 151
(10) A colleague called Smith “gal,” which Smith explained
“reflected racial animosity”; 152
(11) A coworker told a volunteer, who was Somalian, that
discussing ethnic foods was “inappropriate”; 153
(12) A coworker overheard two white colleagues state, “She needs
to go back to the ghetto where she came from,” in reference to
Smith. 154
Smith reported most of the incidents to her immediate supervisor or a
human resources representative, but the only action the defendant took was
to tell Smith’s coworkers that “personal internet use at work was
inappropriate,” in reference to the racist t-shirts they viewed on
www.getoffended.com. 155
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1081–82.
Id. at 1082.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. This Article capitalizes terms referring to race and ethnicity, with the exception of

“white.” At the time of this writing, the propriety of capitalizing “white” is a subject of debate.
Compare Mike Laws, Why We Capitalize ‘Black’ (and Not ‘White’), Colum. Journalism
Rev. (June 16, 2020), https://www.cjr.org/analysis/capital-b-black-styleguide.php
[https://perma.cc/4V9Q-UG5L], with Neil Irvin Painter, Why ‘White’ Should be
Capitalized,
Too,
Wash.
Post
(July
22,
2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/07/22/why-white-should-be-capitalized/
[https://perma.cc/MR77-VAGK].
155

Id.
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The Eighth Circuit held Smith did not establish a hostile work
environment claim, noting the “stringent hostile work environment standard
is designed to ‘filter out complaints attacking the ordinary tribulations of the
workplace, such as the sporadic use of abusive language . . . and occasional
teasing.’” 156
The court separated the above conduct into three categories: no overt
racial animus, some inference of racial animus, and overtly racial animus. 157
It first explained that some of Smith’s allegations, including “the comments
regarding Smith’s lunch, acne, and ability to speak Spanish; the coworker’s
comment about Smith’s conversation with the Somali volunteer; and the
image on The Onion—have no obvious or overt racial animus.” 158 With
respect to the other two categories:
[T]he picture of Buckwheat, the comment about fried chicken,
and the reference to the ghetto, although not all shown or recited
directly to Smith, carry some inferences that they were racially
motivated. . . . Furthermore, the evidence clearly indicates that
Smith experienced unwelcome racial harassment when exposed
to several comments that were explicitly racial in nature.
Specifically, the material on the website getoffended.com, the
comment regarding ‘black aides,’ and the references about
runaway slaves unambiguously permit an inference of racial
animus. 159
However, these incidents were insufficiently frequent because they
occurred over the course of twelve months and insufficiently severe because
they did not involve Smith’s direct supervisors and lacked physical threats
or intimidation. 160 Finally, the court concluded that “although many of the
coworkers’ ‘racially tinged’ comments and actions were ‘ill-chosen,’ and
‘however ill-advised [their] attempts at racial humor, [the] conduct did not
give rise to an actionable claim of racial hostility.’” 161
Judge Bye, dissenting, found the majority committed legal error in its
analysis by separating the allegations into three different categories instead
of looking at the totality of the circumstances. 162 The dissent also noted the
majority replaced its judgment for a jury’s by deciding and disregarding the
instances of harassment it found “tenuously related” to race because “a
rational trier of fact could conclude they were related to Smith’s
membership in the protected group.” 163 The dissent emphasized it is not the
156
157
158
159
160
161

Id. at 1083.
Id. at 1085.
Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 1086.
Id. at 1086–87 (quoting Canady v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 440 F.3d 1031, 1035 (8th Cir.

2006)).
Id. at 1089 (Bye, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1091.
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court’s role at summary judgment to “draw its own conclusions on how
offensive or racially insensitive these instances are to a reasonable person.” 164
With increasing frequency the severe or pervasive and summary
judgment standards appeared to filter out cases involving evidence of
“morally repulsive” 165 racial conduct or epithets that a reasonable juror could
find creates a hostile work environment. 166
V.
THE HISTORY OF MHRA HARASSMENT CLAIMS AND THE
IMPACT OF THE FEDERAL CASE–CREATED SEVERE OR PERVASIVE
STANDARD
Before Minnesota courts recognized the severe or pervasive
standard, harassing conduct was addressed as discriminatory. But, after
Meritor and the adoption of the severe or pervasive standard, Minnesota
courts began relying on federal harassment decisions in their analysis of sex
and race harassment claims.

A. With No Recognized Harassment Claim or Standards, Minnesota
Courts Address Harassing Conduct Based on Race as Discrimination
In early cases, when “harassment” was not yet recognized or was
just newly recognized, courts addressed what now would be considered
harassment as discriminatory or unequal treatment that draws “an adverse
distinction” between persons of different races. 167 For example, in City of
Minneapolis v. Richardson, the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed a
claim of race discrimination in the public accommodation setting,
expressing little tolerance for the use of racial slurs. 168 In Richardson, plaintiff
Samples, a twelve-year-old Black youth, was grabbed by police and dragged
by his feet face-down for twenty-four to thirty-two feet, placed in a squad car,
called the “N-word” several times, had a police dog lunge at and pounce on
him, and was placed in a detention center. 169 Samples was later released from
custody, and no charges were filed. The court upheld the Human Rights
Commission’s finding of discrimination and assessment of punitive
damages. 170 In upholding the Commission’s findings, the court analyzed and
164
165
166

Id. at 1092.

Singletary v. Missouri Dep’t of Corr., 423 F.3d 886, 893 (8th Cir. 2005).

See, e.g., Colliers v. Dallas Cty. Hospital Dist., 827 Fed. App’x 373, 377–78 (5th Cir. 2020)

(holding that the plaintiff being called “boy,” finding N-word scratched on elevator wall and
left for months after complaining, two swastikas drawn on walls of a room the plaintiff worked
in and remained for eighteen months after he complained insufficient); Fortson v. Carlson,
618 F. App’x 601, 607 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding that the plaintiff being called “black ass”
and black ass fool” on nine occasions by five different coworkers insufficient); Carpenter v.
Con-Way Cent. Express, Inc., 481 F.3d 611, 618 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding a coworker’s
extensive use of the N-word, references to slavery, and other racist comments about the
plaintiff’s wife being African American were insufficient to create a hostile environment for
a white employee because the plaintiff heard most comments second-hand).
City of Minneapolis v. Richardson, 307 Minn. 80, 89, 239 N.W.2d 197, 203 (Minn. 1976).
See id. at 80, 239 N.W.2d at 197.
Id. at 82–83, 239 N.W.2d at 200.
Id. at 88–93, 239 N.W.2d at 203–05.
167
168
169
170
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applied the term “discriminate,” including how it was defined in the Act,
and emphasized the negative impact and distinction created by race-based
words:
When a racial epithet is used to refer to a person of that race, an
adverse distinction is implied between that person and other
persons not of his race. The use of the term ‘[N-word]’ has no
place in the civil treatment of a citizen by a public official. We
hold that use of this term by police officers coupled with all of the
other uncontradicted acts described herein constituted
discrimination because of race. 171
The court’s decision was not only grounded in the plain language of
the Act, but also the legislature’s intent that it be liberally construed. 172
Later, the Minnesota Supreme Court took a similarly firm stance
against racial slurs and treatment in the employment context. In Lamb v.
Village of Bagley, the court held racial slurs by a supervisor may establish a
prima facie case of discrimination and rejected the employer’s attempts to
contextualize overtly racist behavior. 173
Lamb, an Indigenous man, worked for the Police Department of the
Village of Bagley just shy of one year. 174 The police chief, Francis “Fritz”
LaRoque, was hostile and abusive toward Lamb calling him “damn Indian,”
“big fat Indian,” “dumb Indian,” and “fat dumb [N-word].” 175 LaRoque also
subjected Lamb to differential treatment compared to white officers,
including requiring him to move into town as a condition of employment,
forcing him and another Native officer to lose weight, and disciplining him
more severely. 176 When Lamb left, the Department replaced him with a
white officer. 177
The Minnesota Supreme Court found “the racial epithets, admittedly
made, coupled with the admittedly disparate treatment, establish[ed]
impermissible discrimination as a matter of law.” 178 The court also held the
“racially derogatory remarks directed at Lamb establish[ed] a prima facie
case of unequal treatment.” 179 Relying on Richardson, the court made clear
“there is no room for the police chief to abuse a minority employee of his
171

Id. at 89, 239 N.W.2d at 203.

Relying on the plain language of the MHRA and the intent it be liberally construed, the
Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the argument that discrimination in the arrest and
detention is not discrimination with regard to full access to a public service. Id. at 203. The
court also rejected the argument, based on Federal Civil Rights Act cases, that municipalities
are not subject to liability unless there is a pattern or practice of discrimination. Citing the
language of the Act, the Court held liability attaches when there is a finding of discriminatory
practice, including a single act of discrimination. Id.
Lamb v. Vill. of Bagley, 310 N.W.2d 508 (Minn. 1981).
Id. at 509.
Id. at 509–10.
Id. at 510.
Id. at 509.
Id. at 511.
172

173
174
175
176
177
178
179

Id.
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department with racially derogatory terms.” 180 The fact the chief of police
abused others did not excuse his abuse of Lamb, nor did the fact that the
chief also identified as “half Indian.” 181
Thus, the Minnesota Supreme Court applied the language and policy
of the MHRA to rid the workplace of race discrimination with little reliance
on federal law.

B. Minnesota Courts Recognize Harassment as a Form of Discrimination
in Violation of the MHRA
Before the U.S. Supreme Court recognized sex harassment as a form
of discrimination under Title VII in Meritor, 182 the Minnesota Supreme
Court recognized sex harassment as a form of discrimination in violation of
the MHRA—based in part on race harassment cases. In Continental Can
Co. v. State, 183 plaintiff Hawkins, a Black woman, testified that her
coworkers subjected her to repeated sexually explicit derogatory remarks,
verbal sexual advances, and physical conduct of a sexual nature for over five
months. 184 Hawkins reported this conduct to management, and nothing was
done. 185 A Department of Human Rights hearing examiner found Hawkins
was discriminated against and awarded damages. 186 The district court
reversed the Department’s decision, and the Department appealed. 187
On appeal, the court was faced with an issue of first impression:
whether sexual harassment by a coworker could be considered sex
discrimination under the MHRA. 188 At the time, the MHRA only prohibited
sex discrimination and did not mention harassment. 189 The court looked to
federal sexual and racial harassment cases but found racial harassment cases
“factually more similar to the case at bar than most existing sexual
harassment cases.” 190 Ultimately, based on the MHRA’s mandate that it be
construed liberally and on similar reasoning applied in federal race
harassment cases, the court recognized harassment as a form of
discrimination: “When sexual harassment is directed at female employees
because of their womanhood, female employees are faced with a working
Therefore, “sex discrimination in
environment different from [men].” 191
180
181

Id.
Id.

Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); see supra Section III.B.
Cont’l Can Co. v. State, 297 N.W.2d 241 (Minn. 1980).
Id. at 245. Some of the comments included coworkers telling Hawkins how they could
make her feel sexually, and that based on their sexual prowess she would want to leave her
husband. Id. A coworker told her “he wished slavery days would return so that he could
sexually train her and she would be his bitch.” Id. at 246. A coworker also patted her on the
buttocks and grabbed her between the legs. Id.
Id. On one occasion when Hawkins reported this conduct, she was told she had to expect
this kind of behavior when working with men. Id.
Id. at 245.
182
183
184

185

186
187
188
189
190
191

Id.
Id.
See MINN. STAT. § 363.03, subdiv. 1(2)(c) (1978).

Cont’l Can Co. v. State, 297 N.W.2d 241, 246–47 (Minn. 1980).

Id. at 248–49.
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Minn. Stat. § 363.03, subd. 1(2) (c) (1978) includes sexual harassment which
impacts on the conditions of employment when the employer knew or
should have known of the employees’ conduct alleged to constitute sexual
harassment and fails to take timely and appropriate action.” 192
To determine that actionable harassment has occurred, the court held
that “all the circumstances surrounding the conduct alleged to constitute
sexual harassment, such as the nature of the incidents and the context in
which they occurred, should be examined.” 193 The court also held the
circumstances regarding notice to the employer should be considered. 194
The court also made clear the MHRA does not require an employer to
“maintain a pristine working environment.” 195 Therefore, prior to Meritor,
Minnesota had its own standard to apply in determining actionable
harassment.
The Minnesota Supreme Court later applied this standard in what
appears to be the only employment based race harassment case the court
has addressed. 196 In Minneapolis Police Department v. Minneapolis
Commissioner on Civil Rights, plaintiff Sterling alleged a claim of “racially
antagonistic attitudes of coworkers.” 197 Sterling, a white woman, was called
the following by a coworker: “that f—ing broad, that gray bitch. It makes me
sick. [N-word] lover. Gray lady.” 198 These statements were made as Sterling
returned to the station with a Black officer. 199 She could hear the coworker
say something but could not hear clearly. 200 A coworker told Sterling what
had been said, and coworkers explained “gray lady” is a slang term meaning
a white woman who has Black friends. 201
Although alleged under the Minneapolis ordinances, the court applied
Continental Can and noted it previously held that “in order to establish a
claim of co-employee harassment it is necessary to show not only
discriminatory treatment but also the employer’s failure to take prompt
action when it knew or should have known of the co-employee’s conduct.” 202
The court determined Sterling’s claim failed because the employer did not

192
193
194
195

Id. at 249.
Id.
Id.
Id.

The court had another opportunity to address a race harassment claim in Hasnudeen v.
Onan but declined to do so on grounds that the issue was not properly before the court,

196

reasoning that the trial court had not addressed it and in the court’s view, the plaintiff had
not pled it. 552 N.W.2d 555, 557–58 (Minn. 1996). The dissent disagreed and stated that
the trial court’s choice not to address the harassment claim “foster[ed] the perception in
communities of color across this state . . . that the system is flawed and stacked against them.”
Id. at 561 (Page, J., dissenting).
Minneapolis Police Dep’t v. Minneapolis Comm’r on Civil Rights, 425 N.W.2d 235, 238
(Minn. 1988) (citing MINNEAPOLIS CODE OF ORDINANCES 139, §§ 139.40(b)(3) and
139.40(k)(3)).
Id. at 237.
197

198
199
200
201
202

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 239 (citing Cont’l Can Co. v. State, 297 N.W.2d 241, 249 (Minn. 1980)).
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have knowledge of the conduct she alleged. 203
Because Sterling’s claim failed on this basis, the court did not address
whether the harassment reached an actionable level. 204 The court of appeals,
however, did address whether the harassment was actionable, and in doing
so relied in part on federal precedent. 205 It would not be long before
Minnesota courts increasingly relied on federal precedent and adopted the
severe or pervasive standard.

C. Minnesota Courts Apply the Federal Severe or Pervasive Standard and
Increasingly Rely on Federal Precedent to Decide MHRA Harassment
Claims
Just months after the U.S. Supreme Court adopted the severe or
pervasive standard in Meritor, the Minnesota court of appeals applied it to
a claim of sex harassment in Klink v. Ramsey County by Zacharias. 206 Rather
than just months later, it appears Minnesota courts did not specifically apply
the severe or pervasive standard to a race harassment claim until almost nine
years after Meritor and Klink, when the court of appeals decided Fletcher
v. St. Paul Pioneer Press. 207 It is worth noting that in decisions before
Fletcher, when the court of appeals addressed whether racially harassing
conduct was actionable, it relied on federal case law in granting or affirming
summary judgment for employers, a practice that became more common.
For example, in Minneapolis, the court of appeals reversed a finding
of race discrimination relying in part on Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co. for
the contention that “not all racial slurs rise to the level of discrimination,”
including when they are “merely part of casual conversation.” 208 In Young v.
Todd Chevrolet, the court also affirmed summary judgment relying in part
on Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc. in holding that
“occasional or sporadic uses of racial slurs or epithets will not in and of
themselves support a claim of racial discrimination.” 209
However, Fletcher v. St. Paul Pioneer Press not only appears to be the
first case where the court of appeals explicitly applied the severe or pervasive
standard to a race claim, but the court reversed summary judgment based

203
204

Id. at 240.
See id.

Minneapolis Police Dep’t v. Minneapolis Comm’n on Civil Rights, 402 N.W.2d 125, 131
(Minn. Ct. App. 1987), aff’d, 425 N.W.2d 235 (Minn. 1988).
Klink v. Ramsey Cty. by Zacharias, 397 N.W.2d 894, 901 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986),
abrogated on other grounds by Cummings v. Koehnen, 568 N.W.2d 418, 423 (Minn. 1997)
(citing Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 60 (1986) for the severe or pervasive
standard without expressly adopting it).
Fletcher v. St. Paul Pioneer Press, No. C7-95-2, 1995 WL 379140, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App.
June 27, 1995).
Minneapolis, 402 N.W.2d at 131 (citing Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250,
1257 (8th Cir. 1981)).
Id. (“Sporadic racial slurs do not become actionable discrimination because they were
uttered by a supervisory employee.”) (citing Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club,
Inc., 568 F.2d 87, 88 (8th Cir. 1977)).
205

206

207

208

209
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on the lower court’s failure to properly apply the standard. 210 While the court
referenced federal case law, it applied the standard to the facts of the case
before it and the decision was not governed by “analogous” federal cases. 211
The plaintiff in Fletcher, an African American man, was employed in
a pressroom. 212 He had a verbal altercation with his supervisor culminating
in the supervisor stating, “I’ll fire your ass you dumb [N-word].” 213 Two
others witnessed this incident, and Fletcher reported it to the defendant. 214
The defendant demoted the supervisor and, based on the collective
bargaining agreement, demoted him to a pressman position. 215 Fletcher
objected to the supervisor being given the pressman position as Fletcher had
been waiting for the position to open and was not given the opportunity to
apply for it. 216 He alleged race harassment, retaliation, and common law
negligence claims. 217 The district court granted summary judgment on all
claims, and Fletcher appealed. 218
The court of appeals specifically recognized that “[r]acial harassment
is an actionable form of race discrimination under the MHRA.” 219 The court
also applied the severe or pervasive standard with reference to federal Title
VII cases. 220 It focused on the totality of circumstances, not simply on the
number of incidents, because “there is neither a threshold ‘magic number’
of harassing incidents that gives rise, without more, to liability as a matter of
law nor a number of incidents below which a plaintiff fails as a matter of law
to state a claim.” 221 Applying these principles, the court of appeals held the
district court erred when it determined the use of a racial slur could not
constitute a hostile work environment. 222
The court found the slur was not part of “casual conversation,” 223
because it was directed at and about Fletcher, made by a supervisor, used in
conjunction with language that could be construed as a threat to terminate
him, made in the presence of other employees, and involved the use of an
epithet with particularly negative connotations. 224 Therefore, because
reasonable minds could reach different conclusions on whether the conduct

Fletcher, 1995 WL 379140, at *5. On remand, the trial court found for the employer on
the harassment claim. Fletcher v. St. Paul Pioneer Press, 589 N.W.2d 96, 101 (Minn. 1999).
Fletcher appealed the court’s finding on his reprisal claim, but not his harassment claim. Id.
Kenneh v. Homeward Bound, Inc., 944 N.W.2d 222, 231–32. (Minn. 2020).
Fletcher, 1995 WL 379140, at *1.
210

211
212

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2 (citing Minneapolis Police Dep’t v. Minneapolis Comm’n on Civil Rights, 402
N.W.2d 125, 131 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987), aff’d, 425 N.W.2d 235 (Minn. 1988)).
Id.
Id. (quoting Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668, 674 (7th Cir. 1993).
Id.
Id. (citing Minneapolis, 402 N.W.2d at 131, in support of the “casual conversation”
213
214
215
216
217
218
219

220
221
222
223

statement).
Id. at *2 (citing various federal appellate and district court cases).
224
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was sufficiently severe or pervasive, summary judgment was inappropriate. 225
Thus, the federal severe or pervasive standard made its way into
Minnesota decisions addressing race harassment via the court of appeals’
decision in Fletcher. The court of appeals also applied and expanded the
application of the standard to other protected classes. 226 The Minnesota
Supreme Court, however, has addressed the standard almost exclusively in
the context of sex harassment. As a result, the standard created for sex
harassment claims became a monolith for all forms of harassment. 227
The Minnesota Supreme Court has addressed the severe or pervasive
standard in a series of MHRA sex-based harassment cases, relying on
federal cases in doing so. In Goins v. West Group, plaintiff Goins, a
transgender woman, alleged she was subject to “scrutiny, gossip, stares,
glares and restrictions” relating to her use of the women’s restroom. 228 The
court considered the claim as one for sexual orientation harassment and
applied the severe or pervasive standard, even though a harassment claim
had not been specifically pleaded. 229 In a footnote, the court recognized that
the MHRA does not explicitly provide for a hostile environment
harassment claim based on sexual orientation but that federal law
recognized a claim for discriminatory harassment “so severe or pervasive as
to alter the conditions of employment.” 230 And, it also noted “[t]he MHRA
is to be construed liberally, . . . with reference to federal law.” 231 Assuming
such a claim existed under the MHRA, the court relied on federal law to set
forth the elements of a hostile environment claim, including the severe or
pervasive standard. 232 The court affirmed summary judgment, holding that
“leering,” “following,” “offensive comments,” and the like do not meet the
severe or pervasive standard. 233
Next, in LaMont v. Independent School District No. 728, the court
cited Goins for the severe or pervasive standard without further
Id. at *2–3.
Wenigar v. Johnson, 712 N.W.2d 190, 205–06 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (recognizing a claim
for hostile environment based on disability consistent with liberal construction of MHRA
and federal case law recognizing same claims under federal disability statute); Minnell v. City
of Minnetonka, No. A08-2183, 2009 WL 2928317, at *4 n.1 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 2009)
(recognizing a claim for hostile environment harassment based on age, noting that the
MHRA’s prohibitions on harassment have been interpreted to apply in contexts other than
sex harassment); Goins v. W. Grp., 635 N.W.2d 717, 726 (Minn. 2001) (assuming claim for
hostile environment harassment based on sexual orientation).
Pat K. Chew, Freeing Racial Harassment from the Sexual Harassment Model, 85 OR. L.
REV. 615, 618 (2006) (noting courts have not recognized a distinct “jurisprudential model
for racial harassment” but rather “view the jurisprudential model for work-place harassment
as monolithic, and that the monolithic model should be the one designed for sexual
harassment”).
Goins v. W. Grp., 635 N.W.2d 717, 726 (Minn. 2001).
Id. at 725. Though gender identity and sexual orientation are independent traits, as of this
writing, the MHRA includes gender identity in its definition of sexual orientation. Minn. Stat.
§ 363A.03 (2021).
Goins, 635 N.W.2d at 725 n.6 (citing Carter v. Chrysler Corp., 173 F.3d 693, 700 (8th
Cir. 1999)).
225
226

227

228
229

230

231
232
233

Id.
Id.
Id. at 726.
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explanation. 234 The court also relied on federal decisions to support its
conclusion that plaintiff LaMont failed to meet the “high threshold” of the
severe or pervasive standard. 235 LaMont alleged that over the course of
several months, a supervisor separated work areas by gender, instructed
female employees not to talk, and made comments about not wanting
women on his crew and keeping women “in their place,” which he said was
in the “kitchen and the bedroom.” 236 The court noted its determination that
the conduct was not sufficiently severe or pervasive was supported by federal
courts interpreting and applying the standard and listed several federal cases
that had been decided in favor of the employer. 237 The dissent challenged
the majority’s reliance on federal decisions because those decisions set a
higher standard than the MHRA requires and instead concluded the
conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive, considering the plain meaning
of the words “severe” or “pervasive” and because the comments and
conduct occurred over a period of months and were directed at LaMont
because she was a woman. 238
Next, in Rasmussen v. Two Harbors Fish Co., the court specifically
addressed and explicitly recognized the severe or pervasive standard:
[I]n determining whether the conduct had the purpose or effect
of substantially interfering with a plaintiff’s employment or
created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive employment
environment under the MHRA, we consider whether the
conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to objectively do so
and whether the plaintiff subjectively perceived her employment
environment to be so altered or affected. 239
The court’s reasoning for its adoption of the standard was that it had
“relied on federal case law interpreting Title VII in the interpretation of the
MHRA” and would “continue to do so here.” 240 Due to underlying errors
by the district court, the supreme court did not address whether the district
court had erred in dismissing the plaintiffs’ harassment claim. 241
234

LaMont v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 728, 814 N.W.2d 14, 21 (Minn. 2012).

Id. at 23.
Id. at 16–17.
Id. at 23. The court referred to the standard in the conjunctive rather than the disjunctive,
as the standard is “severe or pervasive.” See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,
235
236
237

67 (1986).
LaMont, 814 N.W.2d at 24–25 (Page, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (“But this case does
not require us to interpret Title VII or some other jurisdiction’s anti-discrimination law.
Here, we are asked to interpret Minnesota law. The standard for bringing a claim in those
other jurisdictions is inconsistent with Minnesota’s stated public policy. Applying the
standard the court adopts will not ‘secure for persons in [Minnesota] freedom from
discrimination’ in employment because of one’s sex.”) (citing Minn. Stat. § 363A.02, subd.
1(a)).
Rasmussen v. Two Harbors Fish Co., 832 N.W.2d 790, 796–97 (Minn. 2013) (citing
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21–22 (1993); and then citing Goins v. W. Grp,
635 N.W.2d 717, 725 (Minn. 2001)).
Id. at 796.
Id. at 799.
238
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Most recently, in Kenneh v. Homeward Bound, a sexual harassment
case, while the court applied the severe or pervasive standard it made
important clarifications regarding its application under the MHRA. 242
Plaintiff Kenneh, a woman, alleged that over the course of about five
months, a male employee propositioned oral sex, made pervasive tongue
gestures simulating oral sex, followed her, blocked her office door, called
her “sexy,” and spoke to her in a seductive tone. 243
Kenneh asked the court to reject the application of the federal severe
or pervasive standard to sexual harassment claims under the MHRA and
abandon its reliance on federal Title VII decisions. 244 While the court
declined, it made a point to clarify: “We often have relied on federal law
interpreting Title VII when interpreting the Minnesota Human Rights Act.
But our reliance has not been absolute.” 245 The court noted the “significant
differences” between the two laws 246 and made clear that federal Title VII
decisions applying the severe or pervasive standard are not binding on
Minnesota courts: “Our use of the severe or pervasive framework from
federal Title VII decisions does not mean that the conclusions drawn by
those courts in any particular circumstances bind Minnesota courts in the
application of our state statute.” 247 The court also restricted the district
court’s process when applying the severe or pervasive standard and adopted
a jury-centric process. 248 The court placed at the center of the summary
judgment inquiry the goal of eliminating discrimination in the workplace
and rejected a fact-based standard that weighed evidence against dated
standards deemed “not severe enough” from past federal cases. 249 The court
held that under its less stringent standard, the evidence was sufficient to
merit a trial. 250 The Kenneh decision is expected to have an impact on
MHRA workplace harassment cases. 251
VI.

242
243
244
245
246

CONCLUSION

See Kenneh v. Homeward Bound, Inc., 944 N.W.2d 222 (Minn. 2020).
Id. at 227.
Id. at 229–30.
Id. at 229 (citations omitted).
Id. at 229 n.2 (noting how the court recognized sexual harassment as a form of

discrimination and protection against same sex discrimination before the United States
Supreme Court, and that the MHRA provides other broader protections and remedies than
Title VII.)
Id. at 231.
Id. at 231–32.
247
248
249
250

Id.
Id.

Sheila Engelmeier & Heather Tabery, Paskert and Kenneh: the ‘Severe or Pervasive’
Standard in 2020, 77 Bench & B. Minn. 24, 29 (2020) (“Kenneh . . . amounts to a significant
shift for hostile environment claims under the MHRA.”); V. John Ella, Minnesota Sexual
Harassment Law Reviewed by State’s Supreme Court, TREPANIER MACGILLIS BATTINA
251
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dismissed before trial.”).

891

892

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:4

Workplace harassment claims and the severe or pervasive standard
have a complex history. This is due in part to the fact that both concepts
initially arose from case law rather than the statutes, the fact that most of the
development of the standards occurred through sex harassment, and a shift
toward dismissal at summary judgment. The differences between Title VII
and the MHRA complicated matters even more. Indeed, until Kenneh,
Minnesota state courts applied federal precedent, including adopting the
practice of analyzing and deciding MHRA claims based on “analogous”
federal Title VII decisions even though the MHRA provides “more
expansive protections to Minnesotans than federal law.” 252
Though the severe or pervasive standard was once a seemingly
insurmountable hurdle, the Kenneh decision clarified how the standard
applies to MHRA claims and in so doing appears to have brought
harassment cases back in line with the MHRA’s policy to rid the workplace
of discrimination. However, because Kenneh was based on sexual
harassment, how the case will affect race harassment jurisprudence remains
to be seen. The companion to this article discusses the Kenneh decision in
more detail, examining the potential impact of the decision on race
harassment claims. It also suggests that the unique attributes of race and sex
harassment be considered when analyzing each claim rather than
automatically analogizing them as indistinguishable. 253
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Id. at 229.
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